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AMBIGUOUS EXPERIENCE: A CONTRIBUTION TO 
UNDERSTANDING EXPERIENCE AS DISCOURSE
The main concern of this article is to sketch a discursive history of the term experience. The 
paper commences with a cultural ecology of the contemporary usage of the concept and 
proceeds with a brief overview of the history of the concepts of experience and subjectivity, 
intricately connected with discourse on experience in humanities. Lastly, the paper 
offers some reflections on the academic debates that have spun the ‘web of significance’ 
surrounding this much contested term.
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CULTURE OF EXPERIENCE
‘Be yourself’, ‘express yourself’, ‘experience your life’, ‘enjoy’: 
these shibboleths of our time are flying over our personalities demanding 
our own unique experiences, expecting from us articulations of our 
own apprehensions of reality. Experience today is the currency of our 
identity. It is a guarantee of our uniqueness, evidence of our authority. 
It is something that we can hold on to, that can never be expropriated or 
consumed by the other. Experience has become private capital, a personal 
treasure box, with potential to become converted to some material ends; 
for today, in a media culture hungry for ‘reality shows’, it is by our own 
experience that we can even become superstars. Nowadays, we also talk 
about collective experiences. We experience our belonging to groups like 
nations; we experience our social activity and consider those experiences 
the foundations of our attitudes and behaviour. In this sense, the ecology of 
our experiences is spun by cultural and natural factors. 
In their book Experience Economy, Pine and Gilmore write about 
experientization of goods (1999:14) to explain the condition in the present 
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economy in which experiences have become a “distinct economic offering” 
(ibid. x). In his work Die Erlebnisgesellschaft (“The Experience Society”), 
the German sociologist Gerhard Schulze explains how a purpose of a 
product no longer depletes itself in some aim, but in the product itself 
(Schulze 1993:13). In their analysis of indicators of the US economy over 
the past century, Pine and Gilmore (1999:14) have concluded that “people 
are valuing experiences over goods, commodities and services more 
highly”. 
It has become a rule that companies no longer advertise their goods 
and services like books, wastebaskets, drawers, travel arrangements and 
parking places, but rather reading, wastebasketing, drawering, travelling 
and parking experience (Pine and Gilmore 1999:14). As many marketing 
specialists know, people don’t buy things, but the stories wrapped around 
them. These stories have become scripts for staging experience through 
commercial actions like ‘event marketing’ which additionally stimulates 
potential buyers by suggesting surrogate contexts for achieving experience. 
This has become particularly obvious in the entertainment sector, such as in 
the context of amusement parks like Disneyworld where people are offered 
“lifelike interactive experiences” (a chairman of one company cited in Pine 
and Gilmore 1999:3). Baudrilliard (1994:9) calls Disneyland “a deterrence 
machine set up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real”. 
These are just some examples of the commodification of experience.1 
To have and to share an experience has become an influential 
motivational force in our lives clearly articulated in many aspects of our 
culture. Assuming this viewpoint, we could say that we live in a culture 
of experience. It is clear how some sociologists like Schulze have even 
theorized society from the standpoint of this hunger for experience; as he 
rightly notices: “taking pleasure, delighting, enjoyment has become a job, 
a work” (Schulze 1993:38). Appadurai (1996:80), evoking Baudrilliard, 
refers to this same point as the “hypertime of leisure” where “vacation 
indeed becomes a form of work”. Schulze further defines experience society 
1 It should be clarified here that no one can buy or sell experience. Experience is something 
that happens in the interiority of the embodied person. The precise thing to say would be 
that commodities and environments have become means or settings for an experience and 
settings for experience have become a commodity.
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as a society “strongly affected by life conceptions directed toward interior” 
(Schulze 1993:53). Such society is pervaded by “experience rationality” 
characterized by the “functionalization of exterior conditions” to facilitate 
inner life (Schulze 1993:34).
IMAGINED NOSTALGIA OF LATE MODERNITY
In Anthony Giddens’s book Modernity and Self Identity (1991), the 
author paints an apocalyptic landscape of postmodernity or high modernity 
with his insightful analysis of Western culture.2 He calls the age we live in 
apocalyptic not because we are experiencing the end of days but because 
we can no longer rely on our past experiences in order to predict the future. 
In his work Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrilliard (1994:1) describes 
the present situation as “the era of simulation” that is “inaugurated by a 
liquidation of all referentials”. Therefore, if we are to meet yet another day 
on the planet we constantly have to take into account new risks fed to us by 
material progress that is incessantly changing our everyday life (Giddens 
1991:4). Schulze (1993:33) calls this a “deterioration of firm biographical 
patterns”, which are pressuring us to figure out by ourselves what it means 
to be a subject in every new conditions. Stress from unsheltered exposure 
to the calamites of nature has been superseded by stress of making the 
right choice in order to “colonize the future” (Giddens 1991:111). Ever 
new but unreliable, tomorrow is being secured by a self-perpetuating 
neoliberal economy and technological progress. The former promotes the 
rise of individualism whereas the latter is continuously reorganizing our 
conceptions of time and space. 
Movement from production to consumption is the central flywheel 
of free market economy. Freedom of choice is its central axis. It secures 
freedom of contract and mobility of workforce and goods as well as 
individual desires which fuel the turning of the production-consumption 
2 In his book The Consequences of Modernity (1990:45–52) Giddens delivered a 
convincing line of argument on why high modernity is a better term to use. Since this is no 
place to expound on these matters, I simply want to say that here the term postmodernity 
will be used interchangeably with terms like the late or high modernity.
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wheel (ibid. 197). In addition, technological advancements, beginning with 
the printing press, allowed for the evolution of media, and media gave us 
mediated experiences (ibid. 24). The possibility of vicarious experiences 
produced this secondary culture, where, according to Baudrilliard, the real 
and imagined have merged into the hyperreal; where any perception of 
ontological difference is a simulation. Due to this fact, we are all living in an 
imagined world disembedded from our local surroundings. The appearance 
of events and objects, as appropriated by the media, bear more reality for 
us than the events and objects themselves (ibid. 27). 
The state of such disjointment of space from place and time together 
with economy-driven individualism profoundly affects our sense of self. 
Emancipation and a turning inwards or “the reflexive project of the self” 
(ibid. 9) has been the most important tectonic shift in the reorganization 
of our subjectivity. However, the aim of the free market economy is to use 
reflexivity to secure a production-consumption cycle and not to support 
the development of the self. To increase the market means to increase 
the number of consumers and the best way to do this is to proclaim each 
individual human being as a unit of consumption, declaring its inalienable 
right to be free, which in practice really means to consume that which is 
supplied. Schulze sees this reflexive turn as a corollary of the “project of the 
comfortable life” (schönes Leben) (Schulze 1993:34) which for him is the 
prevailing life conception in present society. Reflexivity in Schulze’s view 
makes the subject insecure, and consequently more susceptible to making a 
purchase in the lifestyle supermarket furnished by the consumer economy.
Previous analysis brings to surface two main aspects of how post-
modernity conditions the subject to crave for experiences. The first is 
the stimulation of a pleasure-seeking tendency that is almost completely 
colonized by the consumerist economy through the media. This is marked 
by a desire for the experience of having, of possessing. The other aspect 
has to do with the idea of progress within the project of the reflexive 
self which strives for self actualization and development. As Giddens 
(1991:202) explains, this project ultimately demands the neglect of answers 
to existential questions and seeks to rebel against estrangement and to 
overthrow the repression of the consumerist dogma. It is the desire for 
the experience of being. Thus, our culture of experience may be seen as a 
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tendency that is at the same time promoted by demands inflicted upon us by 
free market enterprise and technology, and our reaction to them.
‘Having’ and ‘being’ as two “fundamental modes of experience” were 
discussed extensively by Erich Fromm (1995:51), a German sociologist and 
psychologist of the Frankfurt school. He explains how these two modes 
are the main two orientations in respect to how we see ourselves and the 
world around us (ibid. 53). He sees ‘having’ as the immediate expression of 
survival instinct (ibid. 52) and does not hold it in high regard, because the 
relationship between the possessor and the possessed is, as he directly puts 
it, “dead” (ibid. 54). In addition, the ‘having mode’ assumes that the subject 
and its possessions are permanent which is contrary to reality. The ‘being 
mode’ according to Fromm is quite the opposite: “It means to renew oneself. 
To grow, to flow out, to love, to transcend the prison of one’s isolated ego, 
to be interested…” (ibid. 62). In fact, in some of his passages he will equate 
the term experience only with the ‘being mode’: “Having refers to things 
and things are fixed and describable. Being refers to experience, and human 
experience is in principle not describable” (ibid. 61, my italics).
There is a resonance of this line of thinking in the work of Jacques 
Lacan who also noticed this polarity in the human appetite for experience. 
One aspect is the search for pleasure and the other is the notion of jouissance 
“as an excessive quantity of excitation which the pleasure principle attempts 
to prevent” (Evans 1996:150). The notion thus goes beyond the economics 
of Freud’s pleasure principle and it is sometimes translated as enjoyment. 
However, being transgressive, jouissance can be at the same time painful 
and pleasurable and thus goes beyond mere enjoyment. Yet Lacan has 
expounded on another concept that might be helpful in elucidating the 
longing for experience of postmodernity. It is his notion of desire. Desire, 
according to Lacan, is unconscious; it is not something directed toward any 
object. As he explains, “desire begins to take shape in the margin in which 
demand becomes separated from need” (Lacan 1977:167). In other words, 
through the linguistic articulation of need into demand, we are left with 
desire. We cannot desire something that we possess; therefore this desire is 
always a “desire for something else” (ibid. 175). It is continuously deferred 
because this desire is ultimately the desire for that elusive other whose 
reflection is proliferated in the mirror stage of our subconscious. 
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Within such an architecture of the interior, we are left with unappeased 
desire, a self-generating action potential that continuously stirs movements 
in our psyche. It is an individual energy cell that can be ultimately harnessed 
by the power plants of the free market economy whose production-
consumption turbines produce more material goods and fictive values. 
In Baudrilliard’s hyperreal world that bears eerie resemblance to Lacan’s 
mirror stage of the unconscious, Baudrilliard (1994:180) explains: “What 
society seeks through production, and overproduction, is the restoration 
of the real which escapes it”. It is due to this undulating desire that the 
subject oscillates between ‘having’ and ‘being’, pleasure and enjoyment, 
consumption and self development, conformism and rebellion. With the 
imposition of conditions that caused the reflexive turn in the subjectivity 
of late modernity, this hankering desire produced a nostalgic or rebellious 
subject. This may be an explanation for the findings of Hutcheon’s (1998) 
evaluation of the western media in which she states that “irony and nostalgia 
are both seen as key components of contemporary culture today”.
Yet, as Arjun Appadurai points out in his Modernity at Large (1996), 
nostalgia has different linkages in this postmodern landscape. Nostalgia 
is not just a hankering for the past as exemplified in the works of Marcel 
Proust. Nostalgia for the past can be appropriated and dovetailed to the 
‘desire for the new’ of younger generations or of societies that never took 
part in that past (Appadurai 1996:30–31,77). Nostalgia becomes divorced 
from memory and affiliated with imagination. It becomes an imagined 
nostalgia of late modernity. Appadurai also calls it “ersatz” or “armchair” 
nostalgia (ibid. 77). 
What is particular about this consumption experience is that in regard 
to production, it has become work not only to produce the commodities but 
also to produce conditions in which such consumption experience can occur 
(ibid. 83). This is in line with Schulze’s observation mentioned above, that 
nowadays, enjoyment has become job (Schulze 1993:38). It is the work 
of linking fantasy and nostalgia to desire for new commodities. Therefore 
Paul McCartney’s success in selling The Beatles to young teenagers, who 
have no memories of the flower power years, lies in his ability to hitch 
“his oblique nostalgia to their desire for the new that smacks of the old” 
(Appadurai 1996:33).
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Thus, the consumers in this picture are driven by a desire for pleasure 
that arises from a tension between fantasy and nostalgia divorced from me-
mory (ibid. 81). Instead of aesthetics of duration, the stimulation of desire for 
the experience of pleasure produces aesthetics of ephemerality or “pleasure 
of the gaze” (ibid. 84). Pleasure of the senses is linked with ephemerality of 
the goods (ibid. 85). Such a state creates practices that involve a new relati-
onship between desire, memory, being and buying (ibid. 84). 
This “turn to pleasure” (ibid. 83) allows us to see the hunger for 
experience of our postmodern times as a desire for ephemeral pleasures. 
The commodification of experience, particularly as discussed by Pine and 
Gilmore (1999) and Schulze (1993), is one of the economic adaptations 
to such shifts in the ecology of cultural experience. The self in this, rather 
reduced and with an outlook perhaps too bleak, either roams the cultural 
supermarket leviathan looking for yet another novel product to possess, 
or the reflexive self rebels, which simply serves as a potentiality for the 
appearance of yet another new item on the shelf. Nostalgia and yearning for 
experience are thus ingrained in the detraditionalised sociocultural milieu 
of our times, supported by an implacable desire for pleasure. 
If, as Schulze maintains, a subject depends on experiences (1993:48), 
then reflexivity of the postmodern subject becomes the driving force that 
brings the subject to yearn for new experiences. An expansion of reflexivity 
is sustained by the influx of new experiences. Similarly to Appadurai, 
Schulze (1993:14) clarifies how this directedness toward experience is 
the most immediate expression of the search for happiness in the social 
environment, where instant gratification and short term goals are valued 
more over those that are long term. On a more global scale, the recent 
economic disasters experienced by affluent countries are a good example 
of this short-term centeredness. 
THE SELF AND EXPERIENCE
The purpose of the foregoing passages was to delineate the broader 
context in which, in Western societies, any human experiencing takes 
place; to point out the importance that experience plays in our culture and 
our daily life, and finally to offer some explanations to the effect of such 
positioning of the experience. The intention was to provide insight into how 
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the ideology of neoliberal capitalism shapes the way we view ourselves, 
which in turn shapes our experiences, polarizing them in two distinct modes 
of “having” and “being”. As a conclusion, it should have become evident 
that any theorizing about experience necessarily implies theorizing about 
the subject. 
Academic articulations on the nature of the self have a long tradition 
in Western thought. A review that would do any justice to the almost 
inexhaustible number of efforts dealing with this ardent issue, lies far 
beyond the scope of this text or the competences of the author. However, a 
necessary sketch of the main historical shifts in the way academic thought 
has conceptualized the self must be presented because it is against these stirs 
in the notions of the self that all our understanding of experience takes place.
Comparing ‘technologies of the self’, as tools used by governments 
to rule the ‘selves’ of the world of pre-modern Christianity and of modern 
times respectively, Foucault reveals an important distinction between the 
two. He sees the self of the past as defined through self-sacrifice, whereas 
the contemporary self is based on strictly positivistic and pragmatic ground 
(Foucault 1999:180). The pre-modern self, as Carrette (2007:142) clarifies, 
is defined in relation to “non-empirical metaphysical ordering”, or God. 
With this in mind, we can start tracing the trajectory of what today is called 
the postmodern self, from the particular period in history when the self 
desired to explore ways of seeing itself other than merely in its relationship 
with eternity. Undoubtedly, one of the very first important stations on this 
journey was the ‘Cartesian theatre’ and the division of the self from its body 
and environment. With Descartes, our propensity to think became a proof 
of our existence which furthered the ontological particularity and atomised 
our society into rational units no longer defined by, but only engaged 
with their surroundings. The mind became the throne of the self from 
which the self sought to dominate nature using the sceptre of scepticism. 
Scientific method demanded from the transcendental God to abdicate and 
to completely withdraw from the sense of self. Instead, the idea of material 
progress trickled in, kindled by the onset of technology. Nourished by 
encyclopaedias of the Enlightenment, the self solidified in modernity and 
became the immovable reference point in the universe, ready to colonize 
the stars and any ‘ultimate other’. But something was lost and “tribulations 
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of the self” (Giddens 1991:181) ensued. Without the ‘axis mundi’ the 
big ‘why’ questions lingered unanswered. All that was left were theories 
and probabilities in the particular and ever diversifying causality of the 
scientific endeavour. The self rebelled against itself questioning the very 
nature of reality. Strained by the ‘linguistic turn’, the cemented self cracked 
along lurking solipsistic sutures and the rift of particularism opened up. The 
subject, as it was, plummeted in. Partly resurrected as a more fluid concept, 
as ‘a particle and a wave’ at the same time, the self of recent academic 
conceptualizations has become more amenable to assume itself, relative to 
the issues of context, power and bias.
Subjected and sacrificed to the higher order of things the self of 
pre-Cartesian world, “was a condition for the opening of the self as a 
field of indefinite interpretation” (Foucault 1999:180). Although the self 
of pre-modern era was also subordinated to all sorts of restrictions, the 
dominating paradigm was ideologically open, the model of the self had a 
built in correction, a ‘way out’, even though it could only be found on the 
other, metaphysical side. As opposed to that, the modern notion of the self is 
based on a positive view of human being or what Foucault calls “permanent 
anthropologism of the Western thought” (ibid. 180). Without metaphysical 
exit, the pre-modern “limit of the Limitless” is replaced by “limitless reign 
of the Limit” (Foucault 1980:32). Thus according to Carrette (2007:142) 
the main difference from the previous modelling of the self is that the 
“self imagining itself” today, is caught in “the self-reflexive ideology of its 
own imagination”, that does not provide any ideological possibilities for 
overcoming this “self-illusion”.
Giddens explains how development of the self as a project of 
postmodern reflexivity requires clarity on existential and moral issues and 
that, in turn, calls for an ideology. On the other hand, oppressive ideologies in 
the form of religious states or totalitarian systems of government, have been 
proven as detrimental to free enterprise capitalism.3 Therefore, existential 
questions are well out of focus in the Western world societies. All situations 
3 That is, of course, except for ideology of free-market economy itself. As Marx shouts 
to us through Debord (1994:151) “The spectacle is the acme of ideology, for in its full 
flower it exposes and manifests the essence of all ideological systems: the impoverishment, 
enslavement and negation of real life.”
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which might trigger those questions, especially around “fateful moments” 
(Giddens 1991:202) like sickness, death or madness, are conveniently 
“sequestered” (ibid. 8), and pushed beyond the purview of every day’s 
existence. In addition to that, secularization trends have relieved the 
religious institutions, as moral pillars of society, of their mundane power. 
All this resulted in a situation where we are left with reflexively stimulated 
self in a “technologically competent but morally arid” (ibid. 201) social 
world, where mastery is valued over morality (ibid. 202). We are pressured 
to be different, authentic but only within the range of options set up by the 
standardized moulds of the conveyor belts of mass production lifestyle 
factories. The existence of abstract capital makes the system so foolproof, 
that it is even capable of commodifying ideas that oppose it. 
Any system of conceptions about the self is an ideology. Ideology is 
giving us the metaphors for introspection which are in turn moulded by the 
power interests of the dominant policies in society. In his explanation on 
reproduction of the relations of production in capitalist economies, Althusser 
explains how “reproduction of submission to the rules of the established 
order” or the “ruling ideology” (Althusser 1972:132), is achieved through 
the action of ideological state apparatuses (religious, cultural, political etc.) 
(ibid. 143). In this process, the subject is actually constituted by ideology 
(ibid. 171), where ideology is “the system of the ideas and representations 
which dominate the mind of a man or a social group” (ibid. 158, 168). 
Ideology, according to Althusser hails or interpellates individuals as 
subjects, as illustrated by the example of a police officer addressing or 
hailing a particular member of the public (ibid. 170–174). Therefore, if 
any operation of the notion of the subject is subjected to the dominating 
conception of the subject (ideology), then we can say that experience, as the 
subject’s function, is a “process of the ongoing imagining and re-imagining 
of ourselves and the world”, within the dominating system of “knowledge 
economy” (Carrette 2007:1). 
The current system of production is constantly financing myopic 
sciences to come up with new ways of modelling and controlling the 
self, in order to attain the capitalistic dream – efficiency (ibid. 183). 
Reductionist fallacies of such modelling are relentless in their attempt to 
thwart the agency of the subject, inside the standard deviations of economic 
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predictability curves. In this way, terminology of the self becomes the 
technology of the self, used by governments and corporations to mould their 
subjects by the moulds of the subject (ibid. 174) provided to them by the 
sciences. Popularity of computer as a model of the mind is a good example.
For more and more consumers, individuality driven by economic 
hunger, was the hand holding the scalpel which made an analytic incision 
that separated individual and social in humanistic disciplines like psychol-
ogy. According to Carrette, this cut is the most important wound that still 
gapes open, and is preventing modelling of the self as an interplay of both 
individual and social forces (ibid. 77). The corporations like simple, static 
or ‘codified’ models which do not take into account what they have neglect-
ed in their reduction in the first place. Whereas that kind of attitude may 
be convenient for the structuring of technological processes, the exclusion 
of human agency from humanistic explanations of human behaviour is, ac-
cording to Carrette, always problematic and potentially totalitarian. Human 
agency will always be the unknown factor among many other unpredictable 
variables in every equation of human behaviour, but factories producing 
commodities cannot work with the unknown. This is why scientists in their 
theorizing about the subject must adopt the ‘ethics of not-knowing’ (ibid. 
209), and account for that which is out of the purview of their designs and 
analytical incisions, because, as Carrette (ibid. 170) concludes:
“The desire to know limits us to the measurable and prevents us from 
realising that we are always more than we imagine, more than we can 
measure, more than we can capture in our languages and patterns of 
evaluation.” 
AMBIGUITY OF EXPERIENCE – OPPOSITES AND 
PARADOXES
In his Songs of experience Martin Jay (2006) traces the polysemic 
ripening of the concept of experience through its, mainly continental, 
intellectual history. His project demonstrates how experience is linked 
to vicissitudes of Western intellectual notions of the self. Jay points out 
how it is exactly in its epistemological modality that the experience 
was introduced first in the writings of European intellectuals of the Age 
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of Reason and Enlightenment, like Bacon, Descartes and Kant (Jay 
2006:40–77). As the industrialization and age of science took their toll on 
the religious issues, German thinkers like Schleiermacher and Otto sought 
refuge for religion in the experience, as that numinous interiority of every 
human being. With the onset of modernity the experience became a proof 
of authenticity. Like the rigid subject of the times, experience in the form 
of nationhoods, womanhoods and other similar concrete constructions 
and ‘deep structures’, was particularly used (and abused) in political and 
historical discourses. As the acidic deconstructive waters started to dissolve 
the fabric of reality, a tendency arose to defenestrate experience, together 
with a decapitated subject, all under paroles of essentialism, metaphysical 
presence and the similar j’accuse proclamations of poststructuralists and 
postmodernists. However, the experience prevailed and adapted to the new 
views on the subject.
Before I continue with the attempt to demarcate the extent of meaning 
the experience encompasses, a brief walk down the etymological lane of the 
term is in order. The first station of “sedimented meanings” (Jay 2005:10) 
point to the Latin word experientia, meaning trial, proof or experiment 
(Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 1996). The noun is derived from 
the verb experiri which means to try or to test. Interestingly, the verb has the 
same root as the word periculum or “danger, trial or peril”, which implies 
a process of gaining knowledge that involves certain risks or encounters 
with danger. The Latin experiri corresponds to the Greek empeira, with 
equal meaning, which is the predecessor of the English word empirical. 
According to Indo-Germanic etymological Dictionary by Julius Pokorny, 
the experience can be further traced down to the Indo-European root *per-, 
which is connected with the following meanings: to try, to dare, to risk to 
fear, but also to carry or go over and to fare. Trial, risk and knowledge are 
the main three shards excavated from etymological antiquity of experience. 
They signify a certain adventurous undergoing, in the form of immediate 
engagement with dubious outcome, due to an unknown obstacle or 
danger. This is one of the reasons why experience results in a memorable 
knowledge. As Turner (1982:18) comments in his own etymological 
analysis of the experience: “By means of experience, we ‘fare’ ‘fearfully’ 
through ‘perils’, taking ‘experimental’ steps.” Consequently, at this point 
of the analysis of the etymology of experience, we encounter the oldest 
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ambiguity in the meaning of the term: experience is both a momentous 
event and the memory or knowledge gained from it. It is the immediacy 
of engagement with exteriority and the reflected result saved in interiority. 
Another opposition subsumed under the term experience has already 
been encountered in earlier sections on experience and reflexivity. It has 
been demonstrated how the hyperreal habitat of high modernity shapes 
the nostalgic self, with experiences polarized into two distinct modes: that 
of possessiveness and pleasure seeking and the other of self actualization 
and giving. One mode, individual, closed and directed toward self, and the 
other, social and open to the world. 
Thus far, we have been faced with two dimensions of antithetical 
meanings of experience, the etymologically oldest one, that of immediacy 
and reflection, and, a more recent one, that of most modern creation – of 
social, as opposed to individual. There are many other nuances those 
dividing lines within this signifier can assume. Experience is a word that 
is both a verb and a noun. It is thus both action and a result of that action. 
Another frequently discussed opposition is ‘experience of’ and ‘experience 
in’. For example: we can have experience of swimming but we can also be 
experienced in swimming. The former being one particular instance whereas 
the other indicates the accumulated knowledge or skill that has been attained 
by repetitive experiencing. Similarly, Jay (2006:403) points out the usage of 
the term in its subjective or objective genitive case. To illustrate, one could 
claim to have had aesthetic experience or the experience of art. Whereas 
with the former, subjective genitive is positioned within the interiority of 
the subject; with the latter it is placed outside, defined by the object as much 
as by the subject itself. According to the presented examples the experience 
is obviously an ambiguous concept that signifies the connection between 
the self and its intended object and the contents of that connection, that 
the self retains as memory. However, there is another meaning to the word 
experience. It is also used to denote a story or knowledge communicated to 
others, as for example, when we share our experiences from the last summer 
or when we exchange our experiences with particular software. As Jay 
duly points out, the term experience is paradoxical in nature for it strives to 
express that which “exceeds concepts and even language itself” (2006:5).
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ERLEBNIS AND ERFAHRUNG
Presumably the most famous dialogue on the contrasting ends within 
the term experience, belongs to the German philosophical tradition that 
distinguishes between Erlebnis and Erfahrung. Those two German words 
can only be translated as experience, because English has no adequate 
pair of words that would account for the entailed difference. Erlebnis and 
Erfahrung signify particular polarity in experience discussed in previous 
paragraphs. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines Erlebnis as a term that 
“in post-Romantic German philosophy…took on the connotation of ‘lived’, 
non-conceptualized, and sometimes ineffable experience” and is contrasted 
to “Erfahrung, which denotes more ordinary perception of interpreted fact” 
(Blackburn 2008). 
According to Jay’s reading of German philosophers, Erlebnis usually 
denotes “primitive unity prior to any differentiation or objectification” 
(2006:11). Since it comes from the German word for life (Leben), it is 
sometimes translated as ‘lived experience’, but directed to particular object. 
In contrast with Efahrung, Erlebnis is understood as „more immediate, pre-
reflective, and personal variant of experience”. Erfahrung, as Jay notes, 
is a “dialectical notion of experience” that implies cognitive processing 
of experiencing and its link with memory and expression in narration. 
Erfahrung draws its etymological roots from the German words for journey 
(Fahrt) and danger (Gefahr) which imply certain ex-temporal reflection 
and accumulation of particular moments of experiencing, which are then 
shaped into a particular experience. It is similar to a learning process that 
brings about wisdom or skill. In that sense, Erfahrung is a communicable 
and public form of experience. 
Jay’s rendition of the history of experience can be seen as a dialogue 
between different understandings of the notions of Erlebnis and Erfahrung 
through various modalities of experience: religious, aesthetic, historical 
and epistemological. However, as Jay notices (2006:12), a meaning 
previously designated to one of those terms, can sometimes be evoked in 
another, by a different thinker. Contrary to the Erfahrung that was already 
used by Kant solely in empirical sense (Jay 2006:66), Erlebnis, as we 
can learn from Gadamer (1975:54), came into usage in the 19th century 
through the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey, expressing something that was 
Stud. ethnol. Croat., vol. 23, str. 283-308, Zagreb, 2011.
Hrvoje Čargonja: Ambiguous Experience: A Contribution to Understanding Experience as Discourse
297
earlier conceptualized by the Romanticists and in the writings of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. In the atmosphere of the ordered mechanical universe of 
the Enlightenment rationalism, the Romanticists, as Gadamer (1975:56) 
explains, felt “alienation from the world of history” and “hunger for 
experience”, which is, on a certain level, similar to the atmosphere of the 
present-day experience society. Intuition and individual experience were 
especially brought to the surface in Dilthey’s life philosophy. Erlebnis, as 
Gadamer points out, was for Dilthey an “ultimate unit of consciousness” 
(ibid. 57).
Based on the exhaustive report given to us by Jay’s Songs of 
Experience (2006), we could summarize that after Dilthey’s enunciation 
of Erlebnis there were roughly two directions followed in the subsequent 
discussions on experience. The first can be demarcated by German thinkers 
like Martin Buber, Rudolf Otto and the phenomenological tradition 
stemming from Edmund Husserl. The other direction can be delineated 
by critical theorists of the Frankfürt school, in particular Walter Benjamin 
and Theodor Adorno. Parallel to German modernist thought, the French 
intellectual tradition, heralded by the names like Derrida, Bourdieu, Barthes, 
Lyotard and Foucault, was greatly responsible for taking on the discussion 
on the self and the experience into postmodern realm. If we read Jay’s epic 
on experience, through the optics of Erlebnis – Erfahrung opposition, it 
is obvious that the infatuation with Erlebnis in Romanticism gradually 
subsided and German thinkers of the modern orientation (Benjamin, 
Adorno, Gadamer), increasingly preferred the term Erfahrung. In general, 
Erfahrung represents a notion of processed and interpreted experience, 
open to the cultural construction and intersubjectivity. Hence it is clear how 
the tide of linguistic turn made thinkers cautions about the existence of pre-
conceptual experience as that irrevocable, autonomous interior from which 
all other conceptualizations are formed and how they were more prone to 
take refuge in the idea of Erfahrung as a basis for critical method.
Anticipated by the works of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, the ideas 
of the decentred self have pervaded the Modernist thought of the first 
half of the 20th century, especially that of the Frankfurt school. As Jay 
points out, phenomenologists also attempted to deal with the problem of 
solitary Cartesian subject. Husserlian ‘lifeworld’, Heiddigerian ‘Dasein’ or 
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Merleu Ponty’s ‘being-in-the-world’ are all influential concepts that were 
used to weaken the idea of transcendental ego, make it susceptible to the 
context and explain how intersubjectivity was possible. Phenomenology 
thus steered into hermeneutical direction which will especially become 
prominent in the writings of Gadamer. With the undermined position of the 
self as a coherent centre of consciousness, the modernist experience, devoid 
of its proprietor, the subject, became a paradoxical “experience without a 
subject” (Jay 2006:265). For the modernity, subjective experience was a 
territory won over from the domination of cold absolutistic rationalism of 
the Enlightenment, and was not to be questioned, despite the weakened 
self. Moreover, the modernity lamented over the loss of ‘true experience’ 
under the rapid transformation of living conditions and rise of mediated 
experience, all provided by galloping technological progress. As Jay 
(2006:359) demonstrates, what Adorno was looking for in his search 
of authentic experience, is not innocence of precategorical immediacy 
of Erlebnis, but an experience where subject encounters, rather than 
dominates, the intended object. This is why for both Adorno and Benjamin 
it was Erfahrung that became a refuge from domination, instead of the 
Romantic Erlebnis, although as Jay (2006:349) points out they both resisted 
reduction of Erfahrung to purely Kantian empirical category.
Gadamer was the most recent influential philosopher who discussed 
Erlebnis – Erfahrung distinction with a clear preference of Erfahrung over 
Erlebnis. The main principle in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, as explained 
in Truth and Method, is to reach an understanding through the “fusion of 
horizons” (Gadamer 1975:390), between the reader and the history of the 
text. In that context, Erlebnis for Gadamer is something that one possesses, 
that belongs to the subject, as it “constitutes itself in memory” and as “its 
meaning remains fused with the whole movement of life” (ibid. 58). It is 
“something unforgettable and irreplaceable, something whose meaning 
cannot be exhausted by conceptual determination” (ibid.). On the other 
hand, Erfahrung is something that a person undergoes. In Gadamer’s view, 
Erfahrung includes critical and cognitive aspects and, in that sense, is more 
profound than Erlebnis. It is a process and not a thing to possess (ibid. 347). 
Erfahrung is integrative and interactive because its “paradigm is not the 
discovery of facts but the peculiar fusion of memory and expectation into 
a whole” (ibid. 217). Under the umbrella of those connotations, Gadamer 
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discusses Erfahrung as dialectics of “historically affected consciousness” 
that “knows about the otherness of the other, about the past in its otherness” 
(ibid. 354). Considering the above, we could see that Gadamer does not 
deny the existence of the precognitive experience, but just stresses its other 
interpretational counterpart as more important in our intersubjective life. In 
that way he deflects the questions of essentiality by focusing on dialogue 
and historicity of the experience.
POSTMODERN EXPERIENCE
Entailed in the discussion on subject, saga on experience will get 
its latest and most disputed chapter by poststructuralist and posmodernist 
thinkers. The analysis of the concept of experience through the opposites 
which this term can unite but to which it can also collapse, brings us, 
historically, to the central question that lingers behind all discussions of 
experience. The question is whether there is an essential, ‘pure experience’, 
in the form of precategorical perception that can be accessed and emulated 
by systematic categorical imagination of academic endeavour and used as 
reliable knowledge. 
In some ways even asking a question like that entails a conception 
of experience that presupposes a “dialectical rationality”, “metaphysics 
of presence”, “pervasiveness of meaning” and “centred subject”, all of 
which are accusations made by late modern thinkers and usually fired 
at phenomenologists (Jay 2006:364). Derrida, as Jay explains (ibid.), 
considered experience as the concept that belonged to the past and was 
suspicious of Gadamer’s Erfahrung, which he saw as metaphysical. 
One of the most significant examples of (de)constructivists’ 
reckoning with the essential experience, is surely the famous article by Joan 
W. Scott (1991) “Evidence of Experience”. In this article, Scott criticized 
the usage of experience by the feminist theorists of the 1960ies, to establish 
an epistemological stance to the philosophy as dominated by male white 
Europeans.
Scott was attacking modernist conception of historical experience 
that drew its roots from Diltheyan infatuation with Erlebnis. Dilthey 
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conceived historical experience as “lived reality in the past that could be 
re-experienced in the present by empathetic historian.” (Jay 2005:250). 
The attempt of the feminists in the sixties, to seek a ground for their 
resistance in the idea of experience, was, in some sense, analogous to the 
modernists seeking refuge in Erlebnis from the colonizing rationality of 
the Enlightenment. Following the trend in historical sciences at the time, 
to move from key actors in history to ordinary experiences of the masses, 
personal reports of individual experiences have become self-evident 
narratives, where no attention was paid to the fact that those narratives 
themselves were a product of circumstance. 
Despite accusations of ‘linguistic transcendentalism’ that pervades 
her writing, Scott’s article is a milestone in a history of experience. In her 
criticism she clearly points to the rhetoric of experience rather then to the 
concept itself. For it is through the imprecise usage of the term experience, 
that the authority arising from immediacy and uniqueness of private 
experiencing, can spill over unnoticed into the other, public end of the 
denotational spectrum of the term. Thus, the specific, subjective authority is 
transferred to general and intersubjective, without proper examination of the 
process of this transfer. Failure to pay attention to the process of mirroring 
of this authority in the academic discussions is the reason why experience 
was often (mis)used to “essentialize identity and reify the subject” (Scott 
1991:797). In that sense, Scott’s call to redefine the term, examine its 
discursiveness and “politics of its construction” (Scott 1991:797) is more 
than justified. Although hesitant to abandon the term, Scott realizes that 
experience is a “word we cannot do without” (Scott 1991:797). She adds: 
“Experience is, in this approach, not the origin of our explanation, but that 
which we want to explain” (Scott 1991:797). 
EXPERIENCE – ESSENTIAL VS. CONSTRUCTED
Ambiguous concepts like experience do not allow themselves 
to be exhausted by some definition, they usually flactuate between the 
contradicting poles bestraddled by the term. Through optics of Cartesian 
dualism experience is seen as that what subject gets when it apprehends the 
object, modernity regards experience as an encounter between the subject 
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and the object, whereas postmodernists tend to merge subject and object 
with the experience. Subject is thus no more than an omnipresent hovering 
observer, who sometimes forgets itself. The sense of self becomes a 
dynamic field of activities constituted by the embodied expression through 
symbolic communication. However, as much as Derridian shibboleth 
“there is nothing outside the text” sounds appealing in the light of relativist 
worldview, there is, at least in my own case, certain uneasiness about it that 
rebels against reduction of myself to a mere patchwork. Therefore, I’d like 
to argue that such an approach is also myopic and falls short in its aim to 
explain away the human experience. 
First of all, I would like to follow reasoning of Heelas (2005) in his 
article on postmodernism and religion where he demonstrates how such 
claims about the primacy of the text, are ontological statements, and thus just 
as problematic as claiming the existence of transcendental self. If, as Nagel 
(1986) maintains, “view from nowhere” does not exist, the question is where 
exactly do we have to stand in order to make that observation? Absolute 
statements like that are always self-defeating and, to evoke Carrette, it seems 
that they are the product of our knowledge economy that does not tolerate 
the “unknown”. If our sense of self is always contextual and immersed that 
does not mean that we do not have an ability to exercise bracketing as much 
as we can, providing that we leave the widow for error open. 
Another perspective on the uncanny image of the pastiched self 
compels me to think how constructivism should be practiced more as a 
method than as ontology. It seems that by revolutionary overthrow of the 
centred subject and experience, the language has become essentialised 
in the particularists’ rhetoric. Thus the epistemological troubles with 
intersubjectivity were abandoned for a flood of contexts in intertextuality. 
Such theoretical discourse still obscures meaning making and disallows 
comparison. In addition, if meaning lies in that which is not the signifier 
and if there is no reliable point of reference for interpretation, then it is 
extremely difficult to pass any ethical judgement. This whole constructivist 
project then resembles a futile attempt to lift ourselves up in the air by means 
of our own hands. We can lift a hand or a leg, or even a trunk of the body but 
we can’t really lift the whole of our body without using some kind of fixed 
point outside of us. That fixed point, or point of reference, in postmodern 
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discourses on the subjectivity, is always an ideology, but even that claim, 
together with the nihilistic claim on the non-existence of that reference, is 
also always an ideology, always constructed and always in danger to be 
abused in games of power. Therefore there must be ‘something’ whereupon 
we agree, whereby we are able to agree. The fact that ‘something’ is not 
possible to be incarnated in the language or quite fully grasped, does not 
mean that it does not exist. 
As far as the existence of pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual experience 
is concerned, it is obvious that language is only part of experiencing and 
that our interiors are more than just an ebb and flow of symbolic tide. We 
do not think just in sentences. We think in pictures, sometimes in melodies, 
sometimes in feelings and embodied sensations. Since we swim through our 
memory which does not have a signifier attached to everything we attend 
to, how can we expect to fully account for a whirl of sensations from the 
outside world? In the same sense, we could ask if Hellen Keller had some 
notion of the wet thing in a glass before someone spelled it out for her on her 
palm? We are, as Geertz (1973:5) paraphrases Weber: “animals suspended 
in the web of significance”, but, as Carette warns us, we are always much 
more than we can possibly spin in our attempts to explain it.
Experience is a term that is capable of uniting the opposites, of 
traversing that which is often hard to express. By using experience we are 
explicating something that is inherently inexplicable. This is exactly the 
reason why we need a concept like experience, especially when we are on a 
quest to understand how humans make meaning of themselves and society. 
Experience allows us to go beyond categories of positivistic reductionism 
which can never account for human irrationality and agency. However, as 
postmodernists warn us, we should always be mindful of the issues that 
motivate (or fund) our particular experiments and especially how they 
shape what we see and what we theorize. As Jay (2006:406) remarks: “the 
question always has to be asked: experience in the service to what end?” If 
we make ourselves and our readers aware of the fact that experience, like 
many other loaded terms in the humanities, such as culture, religion, belief 
etc., has its discursive history channelled along the interests of power, and if 
we attempt to disclose those workings within the scope of our research, then 
our analysis may allow us to relish the explanatory power of the experience.
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As I have proposed before, I believe that we can do justice to experience 
by being aware of the multidimensionality of polarities that demarcate the 
meaning of the term. That means studying the web of polarities into which 
the meaning of experience is suspended; polarities that do not have clear-
cut boundaries between them but are permeable according to the issues of 
context and even ready to disappear if the circumstance requires so. One 
could charge such approach by accusation of Cartesian conditioning that 
results in blind spot unable to see beyond these opposites. Nonetheless, I 
believe that there is no way to avoid dualism in any analysis. There are some 
fundamental polarities that constitute even our postmodern understanding 
of the self. Overemphasizing monistic self is contrary to that notion of 
embodied self-experiencing being, for that being has two legs, two arms, two 
brain hemispheres. That being clearly distinguishes that which is inside (like 
thoughts, feelings, memories) from that which is outside (like uttered speech, 
physical activity etc.). We are quite certain about that which is new or already 
familiar to us. We also know which thoughts belong to the past and which 
are just wishful projections of our future. We exist oscillating between the 
opposites, not in union with them. As Jay (2006:403) affirms: “it is precisely 
the tension between subject and object that makes experience possible”.
The problem with dualism, as Scott reveals in her article, is not in the 
fact that it doesn’t exist but in the way we are applying it. It usually comes 
down to our inability to see connections instead of borders, continuum 
instead of poles. In other words, there are Erlebnise as a part of every 
Erfahrung and every Erlebnis is shaped by previous Erfahrungen. If 
used carefully, experience can allow us to traffic this paradoxality, this 
‘in-betweenness’ through the convoluted roads of symbolic interaction. 
Juggling with experience in awareness of its complex and dynamic 
properties forces us to be more mindful and cautious in our discourse so we 
do not succumb to commodificational reductionism that just wants to invent 
yet another ‘technology of the self’ for population control.
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INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION
The moment we turn our senses to any object in our surroundings 
and intend them the process of interpretation begins. First filter that shapes 
our intending of the outside world is our biology, like the (in)ability to 
see colours, a possible scar on our finger that makes that piece of skin 
insensitive to cold etc. From this point of view, a view from the ‘outside’, 
everything is a construction. From this exterior view we cannot see how 
‘meaning’ assumes its shape from the patchwork of hyeletic data which 
are interpreted from the moment the signals from the outside touch our 
receptors. This view is a view of an analyst dissecting its subject. But there 
is another view of this process and this is a view from the inside. This 
view assumes internal observer which oscillates between participation and 
observation, dissolution and centeredness, which can apparently maintain 
certain distance from what is being intended in interiority, but can be also 
completely lost in the immediacy of the flowing content. Can we ever hope 
to make peace with these two views? 
Attending to the polysemic complexity of experience has been 
quite an undertaking for anybody who has ever dared to venture into 
such an enterprise. Experience is a demanding discourse with rich history 
intricately related with how we conceive and rule ourselves. As entry in the 
Vocabulary of Culture and Society reads: “Experience is one of the most 
compelling and elusive words in the language” (Berube 2005:121). The 
subject of experience is indeed a subject that no article can do justice. It is a 
multifaceted term that can be approached as a concept from various fields: 
psychology, sociology, philosophy, history, religion, politics, economy and 
the media. This is the reason why information given in the first, introductory 
part of this article may have been somewhat scattered. My intention was to 
point out some specificities linked to the term. Those specificities, I believe, 
illustrate the complexity of the involved factors, when one tries to theorize 
experience. I have focused on the economic aspect of cultural experience 
because I believe it is exactly this aspect that glosses out perhaps a neglected 
force in cultural economy: human desire for pleasure. We are more likely 
to keep experiencing something we like. Desirable experiences are usually 
high in value. Some experiences are only possible through collaboration of 
individuals with various motivations. Commercial motivations are crucial 
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in organizing our landscape ‘of and for’ cultural experience which possesses 
various facets of “cultural flows” (Appadurai 1996:33). Our culture rests 
on economy with all of its ecological implications, just as our experiences. 
In this theoretical exploration into the concept of experience the 
steps are unavoidably traced by the author, more so because of the complex 
nature of this concept. Reduction and selection are unavoidable. Because of 
that, some authors like Reinhardt Koselleck and reader reception theorists, 
Pierre Bourdieu, Paul Ricoeur, etc., have been omitted despite the fact 
that they have provided important insights on the architecture of cultural 
experience.4 In addition, this article also does not discuss reverberations of 
discussions on experience in anthropology.5 However, I have attempted to 
understand experience not just as a movie in Cartesian cinema, but also a 
site for various precultural and natural factors.
I believe that ‘experience’ as a term forces academic thinking and 
discourse to tackle an ambiguity so deeply ingrained into this concept, 
which reflects the paradoxality of human experience in toto, stretched 
across polarisations like self and the other, individual and society, solipsism 
and interaction, nature and culture, essential or constructed. The term 
requires that we deal with those polarities. This is why many authors see 
experience as evasive, yet unavoidable term. But indeterminacy is a part of 
the nature of social reality. In that sense experience may be one of the terms, 
like Bourdiean habitus, which strives to encompass what is often divided in 
academic discussions. Therefore, the intention of this article is to establish 
ambiguity that oscillates at the heart of the discourse around this term, with 
a special focus on the patterns in experience’s symbolic, historical and 
academic modalities.
In my own review of experience as discourse, I have tried to present 
the short overview of the history of the concept, give the most general 
cultural context of the present day usage of the concept, and superficially 
attend to the experience’s ‘web of significance’. Since the discussion on the 
experience is dominated by polarizations, especially along the essentialist-
constructivist trench, I would like to conclude with a story that is a derivative 
4 See: Kosseleck 1985; Bourdieu 1977; Ricoeur 1985.
5 See: Turner and Bruner 1986; Csordas 2000; Throop 2003.
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of the Zenon’s famous aporia on Achilles and the tortoise, which I think is 
a good analogy for this argument.
If we throw a stone towards a tree we could describe the trajectory of 
the stone in the following way: The stone traversed half of the distance and 
it has another half to go. Then the stone flies through the half of that half 
and still has a quarter of the total distance to go. Then half of that quarter, 
then half of the eights and so on. In this description the stone never reaches 
the tree because the distance, no matter how small, could always be split 
into halves. But as we know, from experience, the stone, if we aimed well, 
hits the tree. 
Except for being rational and tangible, our own nature is just as much 
irrational and ephemeral. Such are our experiences, too. Paradoxality of 
this situation brings rational modelling of human nature always in a dead 
end. However, our attempts are not futile, they are another slide down 
the asymptote of that immediate presence that will forever magnetize our 
ruminations on experience, but could never be quite grasped by them.
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Hrvoje Čargonja
DVOSMISLENO ISKUSTVO: 
PRILOG RAZUMIJEVANJU ISKUSTVA KAO DISKURSA
Članak prikazuje diskurzivne povijesti pojma iskustvo. Rad započinje s kulturnom 
ekologijom suvremene uporabe pojma iskustvo te nastavlja s kratkim pregledom 
povijesti pojmova iskustvo i subjektivitet, usko povezanog s humanističkim znan-
stvenim diskursom o iskustvu. Članak također donosi promišljanja o znanstvenim 
raspravama koje su isplele “mrežu značenja” ovoga prijepornog pojma. 
Ključne riječi: iskustvo, diskurs, subjektivitet, kultura iskustva
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the following grant from the Croatian Ministry of 
Science, Education and Sports: “Population Structure of Croatia – anthropogenetic 
approach” (No. 196–1962766–2751 to P. R.).
